Cases, Regulations and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P., Jr.
Volume 4 | Number 4 Article 2
2-19-1993
Cases, Regulations and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr.
Agricultural Law Press, robert@agrilawpress.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr. (1993) "Cases, Regulations and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 4 : No. 4 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol4/iss4/2
commodity and should not be responsible for its sale or in
any way be connected with its sale.
Even with those steps taken, gifts to spouses or other
close family members may be challenged if the principal
purpose appears to be avoidance of self-employment tax.
A reason for the gift other than minimizing self-
employment tax is helpful.
FOOTNOTES
1 See I.R.C. § 1221(1). See generally 4 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 27.02 (1993).
2 See I.R.C. § 1402.
3 See Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 C.B. 223; Rev. Rul. 55-
531, 1955-2 C.B. 520.
4 1955-1 C.B. 223.
5 1955-2 C.B. 520.
6 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991; Ltr. Rul. 9229002,
Feb. 28,1992.
7 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9210004, Nov. 29, 1991.  See Ltr. Rul.
9229002, Feb.28, 1992 (same).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
COLOR OF TITLE. The parties’ lands were
separated by a river. The defendant’s predecessor in title
constructed a fence on the defendant’s property in the
1930’s which ran over a hill some distance from the river.
The disputed land was the strip between the fence and the
river on the defendant’s side of the river. The defendant’s
deed named the river as the defendant’s boundary but the
plaintiff’s deed listed the “hill on the other side” of the
river as its boundary. The plaintiffs used the disputed land
to graze cattle. The plaintiffs produced evidence that the
community considered the plaintiff’s land to run to the
fence on the other side of the river. Although the various
deeds were not consistent, the court upheld the jury
verdict that the plaintiff acquired the land by adverse
possession. The court held that the deed description of the
land boundary as the “hill on the other side” was sufficient
color of title to support adverse possession and that the
plaintiff’s grazing of cattle was sufficient hostile
possession to support adverse possession. Quarles v.
Arcega, 841 P.2d 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
HOSTILE POSSESSION . The defendant’s
predecessors in interest purchased 90 acres of land and
leased 14,000 contiguous acres from the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest. The parties intended that the 90
acres included a parcel known as Solo Springs, but that
parcel was actually included in the legal description of the
leased portion. The defendant purchased Solo Springs
from the purchaser, based on the purchaser’s belief that
the parcel was owned by the purchaser. The defendant
built a house and other improvements on the parcel. The
defendant discovered the error in 1973 and 1978 after
having a survey performed. In 1979, the plaintiff
purchased 10,000 acres from the owner of the leased acres
and Solo Springs was included in the legal description of
the purchased acres. After the defendant requested a
quitclaim deed from the plaintiff based on adverse
possession of Solo Springs, the plaintiff brought the
present forcible entry and detainer action.  The court
upheld the trial court’s judgment for the defendant. The
court held that the prohibition of adverse possession by a
tenant against a landlord did not apply because neither the
defendant nor the predecessor in interest believed that they
leased the property from the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s
predecessor in interest. The court also held that the
improvements made by the defendant were sufficient
evidence and notice of hostile possession of the disputed
land. The court rejected the plaintiff’s defense that neither
it nor its predecessor in interest knew about the
defendant’s improvements. Lewis v. Pleasant Country,
Ltd., 840 P.2d 1051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
OPEN POSSESSION. The plaintiff claimed title to
the disputed land by adverse possession under color of
deed. The plaintiff provided evidence of rotational rice
farming whereby the land was cropped one year and left
fallow for two or three years. For several years, no rice
was planted but the land was used for grazing, although no
fence was erected. The court held that the plaintiff’s
possession was not sufficiently visible to support title by
adverse possession because the land became sufficiently
overgrown so as to erase evidence of rice cropping.  In
addition, the use of the land for grazing was not sufficient
because the grazing was not continuous and no fence was
erected as evidence of hostile use. Parker v. McGinnes,
842 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  A third party had
obtained the debtor’s house by a tax sale in 1989. The
debtor’s redemption rights expired in June 1992 and the
third party obtained a tax deed on the property. The debtor
filed for bankruptcy in August 1992 and sought to avoid
the tax deed as a fraudulent conveyance under Section
548(a). The third party sought to dismiss the action
because the transfer occurred more than one year before
the bankruptcy petition. The court denied the third party’s
motion and held that the transfer occurred when the
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                              27
redemption period expired and the tax deed was obtained.
In re Moreau, 147 B.R. 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors filed in Chapter 12
and reached an agreement with a secured creditor to use
the proceeds from the sale of collateral in the operation of
their farm during the bankruptcy case in exchange for
granting the creditor a replacement lien on farm
equipment. After the debtors had used up the cash
collateral but before completing the plan, the debtors
converted the case to Chapter 7 and claimed the farm
equipment as exempt tools of the trade.  The debtor sought
to avoid the replacement lien on the exempt equipment as
impairing their exemption. The court could not find any
statutory guidance or case precedent and held that the
agreement was binding on the parties and the debtors were
estopped from avoiding the lien. In re Gilbert, 147 B.R.
801 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1992).
COURT AWARDS.  The debtors, husband and wife,
had received personal injuries in four separate incidents,
two incidents for each debtor. Each debtor claimed a
separate $7,500 exemption, under Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, ¶
12-1001(h)(4), in the payments received for each personal
injury incident.  The court held that the exemption was
limited to a total of $7,500 per person, regardless of the
number of personal injuries involved or the number of
payments.  In re Rhodes, 147 B.R. 443 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992).
HOMESTEAD. In May 1990, the debtor filed for
Chapter 13 bankruptcy and claimed a $5,000 exemption
for the homestead. The debtor moved out of the house in
October 1991 and converted the case to Chapter 7 in
November 1991. The house was sold at foreclosure sale
and the debtor claimed $5,000 of the proceeds as exempt.
A creditor argued that the house lost its homestead status
when the debtor moved out of the house prior to
conversion of the case. The court held that the status of the
house as an exempt homestead was determined as of the
date of the original petition and allowed the exemption.
The court rejected the contrary holding of In re Lindberg,
735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073
(1984). In re Schooner, 147 B.R. 430 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1992).
IRA.  The debtor claimed an exemption under Section
522(d)(10)(E) of $14,000 in an IRA. The debtor was 51
years old and had monthly expenses in excess of monthly
income. The debtor’s spouse was under continuing
medical care after cancer surgery. The court held that the
IRA was exempt as reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor because of the debtor’s age and inability to
fund another retirement plan before retirement age, given
the medical needs of the spouse and lack of disposable
income. In re Sisco, 147 B.R. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1992).
The debtor claimed an exemption under Section
522(d)(10)(E) of $3,000 in an IRA. The court held that an
IRA was eligible for the exemption and because the
objecting parties failed to demonstrate that the IRA was
not reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor, the
debtor’s interest in the IRA was exempt. In re Yee, 147
B.R. 624 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
INVOLUNTARY PETITION .  The debtor was a
corporation which raised feeder pigs. One individual was
the sole shareholder, director and officer of the
corporation and had operated the business before
incorporating it. The debtor was incorporated in January
1991 and the involuntary petition was filed in December
1991. The creditor argued that the debtor could not be a
farmer for purposes of Section 101(20) because the debtor
had no income in the taxable year previous to the taxable
year the petition was filed. The debtor argued that the farm
income from the shareholder’s operation of the business in
the previous taxable year should be included in
determining the debtor’s status as a farmer under the
bankruptcy code. The court held that the debtor was a
farmer against which an involuntary petition could not be
filed. In re KZK Livestock, Inc., 147 B.R. 452 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1992).
LIEN DISCHARGE . The FmHA had two
undersecured claims against the Chapter 11 debtor
rancher, one secured by real property and one secured by
chattels, but neither lien was cross-collateralized. The
FmHA made the Section 1111(b) election and voted to
confirm the plan which provided two cash payments to
satisfy the Section 1111(b) election and two schedules for
payment of the two secured claims.  The debtor paid off
the chattel-secured claim and the two Section 1111(b)
cash payments and sought release of the lien against the
chattels.  The FmHA argued that the chattel lien should
remain to secure the remaining secured claim payments.
The court held that the secured claims were separate and
once the Section 1111(b) election requirements were
satisfied (as defined by the plan provisions), the lien
securing a separate claim would be released upon full
payment of the claim where the claims were not cross-
collateralized.  In re Cook, 147 B.R. 513 (D. S.D. 1992),
aff’g on point, 126 B.R. 575 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1991).
    CHAPTER 12
ATTORNEY’S FEES. When the debtors realized that
their farm was at risk of being lost to creditors and
possible criminal liability, the debtors retained their
bankruptcy attorneys. The law firm required a
“nonrefundable retainer” of $20,000 which the debtors
paid by liquidating all of their unencumbered assets.  The
bankruptcy case was filed in Chapter 12 but the law firm
did not seek court appointment as bankruptcy counsel nor
disclose the full amount of the retainer paid by the debtors
until more than three months after the petition. The court
found that the extraction of the retainer used up all of the
debtors’ operating funds, resulting in the debtors’ inability
to feed their animals and the loss by starvation of much of
their cattle.  The ultimate result of the law firm’s conduct
was the loss of the farm and the debtors’ seeking
employment outside of farming. The court found that the
law firm’s belated request for appointment nunc pro tunc
was not excusable but granted the request in recognition of
services rendered. However, because of the delays caused
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by the firm, unnecessary work performed by the firm,
inflated hours claimed for routine work and damage to the
debtors’ reorganization prospects, the firm was allowed
only half of its claim for fees.  In re Burke, 147 B.R. 787
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1992).
DISMISSAL. During a hearing on the eligibility of the
debtors for Chapter 12, the debtors requested a voluntary
dismissal. The court granted the request and instructed the
debtor’s attorney to submit an order for dismissal.
Instead, the attorney later requested a withdrawal of the
request for dismissal, alleging that an agreement with
creditors had fallen through and that the agreement had
been the basis for the dismissal request. The court found
that no agreement was offered and that the dismissal
request was merely an attempt to delay the proceedings;
therefore, the court awarded the creditors attorneys’ fees
and costs resulting from the delay and dismissed the case.
In re Chase, 147 B.R. 630 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtors had listed their
federal income tax liability as a claim in their bankruptcy
case and the IRS received notice of the case. The
confirmed plan provided for payment of the tax claim
outside of the plan.  Eight months after the confirmation,
the IRS sent the debtors a notice of intent to levy for the
taxes in the claim. The debtors claimed that the levy notice
violated the automatic stay and filed for an injunction and
costs, including attorney’s fees. The IRS did not claim
sovereign immunity but claimed that damages were
awardable only under I.R.C. § 7430. The court held that
the debtors were entitled to an injunction and costs under
Section 362(h) because the IRS had filed a claim in the
case. In re Boldman, 147 B.R. 448 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1992).
After the debtors had filed for bankruptcy, the IRS
filed a tax lien against their homestead to secure a
prepetition tax claim.  The lien was filed without
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing.  However, after the
IRS was notified of the bankruptcy filing, the IRS
negotiated the release of the lien by requiring the debtors
to deliver two refund checks back to the IRS and to pay
the remaining amount of the tax claim from the proceeds
of the sale of the homestead.  The debtors had claimed a
homestead exemption. The court held that although the
initial filing of the tax lien was not a willful violation of
the automatic stay, the failure of the IRS to release the lien
without conditions after learning about the bankruptcy
filing was a willful violation of the stay. The court ordered
the IRS to release the lien and to satisfy the remaining
amount, over $7,000, of the tax claim.  In re Rhodes, 147
B.R. 492 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).
CLAIMS.  The debtor included federal tax claims,
including a claim for withholding taxes, in the schedules
filed with the petition and the IRS filed a timely claim for
income taxes.  The IRS filed a late amended claim
including additional amounts for unpaid withholding taxes
and the trustee objected, arguing that the amended claim
was improper because the claim for withholding taxes was
a new claim.  The court held that the amended claim was
not allowed to the extent of the new claim for withholding
taxes because the claim did not relate to the timely income
tax claim and the debtor gave the IRS notice of the
debtor's relationship with the business in the schedule of
claims.  In re Vecchio, 147 B.R. 303 (E.D. N.Y. 1992),
aff’g, 132 B.R. 239 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1991).
CONSOLIDATION. The debtors had operated a
restaurant with several assets, including the liquor license,
held by corporations. The bankruptcy trustee requested
consolidation of the corporations with the debtors on the
basis that the corporations were mere alter egos of the
debtors. The consolidation was granted. The IRS had a
filed tax lien against the property of the debtors for
income tax deficiencies and asserted that its lien attached
to the proceeds of the sale of the liquor license. The court
held that because the corporations were consolidated with
the debtors, the corporations’ assets became included in
the debtors’ bankruptcy estate and subject to the lien. In
the alternative, the lien reached the corporations’ assets
under the alter ego theory used by the trustee to
consolidate the debtors with the corporations. In re
Cooper, 147 B.R. 678 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had filed a Chapter 7
petition in March 1992, within three years after the due
date for the debtor’s 1988 federal taxes. That case was
involuntarily dismissed in May 1992 and the debtor refiled
for Chapter 7 six days later. The second petition was filed
more than three years after the 1988 tax return was due
and the debtor sought to discharge those taxes under
Section 523(a)(1)(A). The court held that the first
bankruptcy case suspended the three year period such that
the second petition was not filed more than three years
after the 1988 tax return was due. In re Bowling, 147 B.R.
383 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
INCOME TAX RETURNS. Citing Holywell v.
Stanton Smith, 112 S. Ct. 1021 (1992), the court held that
a Chapter 7 liquidating trustee was required to file an
income tax return for a bankruptcy estate. In re Pizza
Pronto, Inc., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,003 (11th
Cir. 1992).
PENALTIES. In a case in which the IRS won on
principle but apparently will lose financially, the IRS
appealed a judgment allowing only one-third of a claim
for statutory penalties against the debtor.  The debtor had
failed to file income tax returns for several years prior to
filing bankruptcy because of ill health and reliance on
unreliable people to file the returns. The IRS filed a claim
for the unpaid taxes and penalties after the debtor filed
returns for some of the years and paid the back taxes. The
trial court reduced the penalties by two-thirds without
stating the grounds for the reduction. The IRS appealed,
arguing that the penalties must either be approved or
denied in their entirety. The District Court affirmed the
judgment, stating that if the partial reduction was not
allowed, the penalties should be denied. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the penalties must either be
approved or denied in their entirety. As a concurring
opinion notes, the IRS likely had an empty victory as the
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lower courts most likely will deny the penalties. The
concurring justice  quoted  Phyhus:  “Another such victory
. . . and we are undone.”  In re Sanford, 979 F.2d 1522
(11th Cir. 1992).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF WARRANTY . The plaintiffs operated
a vegetable and grain farm and contracted with the
defendants to apply herbicide to fields which were to be
planted with cabbages. After the first crop of cabbages
died, the plaintiffs replanted the field and were forced to
plant another field with a less profitable cucumber crop.
The second crop of cabbage also died and the plaintiffs
tested the soil. The soil test discovered a herbicide lethal
to cabbage and the plaintiffs sued the defendants for
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and
warranty for a particular purpose. The trial court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs and awarded the loss of profits
from the inability of the plaintiffs to plant both fields in
cabbage, less the profits from the cucumbers. The
judgment and profits award was affirmed on appeal. The
appellate court, however, reversed an award for loss of
trucking profits and expenses from the chemical kill
because the damages were not proved with sufficient
certainty. Ouwenga v. Nu-Way Ag., Inc., 604 N.E.2d
1985 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
PEANUT QUOTA. The plaintiff contracted to
purchase a farm from the defendant.  The contract
provided that the defendant would transfer two-thirds of
the defendant’s peanut quota with the farm. After the sale,
the ASCS refused to allot more than 55 percent of the
quota unless the defendant signed a transfer form. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that the court had no jurisdiction over the peanut
quota. The appellate court reversed, holding that the case
involved only a breach of contract because the ASCS
testified that the two-thirds quota would have been allotted
except for the failure of the defendant to sign the proper
form.  The court held that the sales contract required the
defendant to take the necessary steps for the transfer and
that the failure to file the ASCS forms was a breach of
contract. KcKim v. Kauffman, 424 S.E.2d 11 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1992).
RESCISSION. The plaintiffs entered into a sales
contract with the defendants to sell their ranch. The trial
court found that during the negotiations, the plaintiffs
revealed to the defendants that the water on the ranch
would not “test out” but that the plaintiffs had not had any
problems with the water. The defendants refused to close
the real estate contract after a test of the water showed the
water to be contaminated. The court held that the
defendants had no reason not to perform the contract
because they were told that the water would not test as
uncontaminated. The trial court had awarded the plaintiffs
$43,000 in liquidated damages under the sales contract
clause setting liquidated damages at 10 percent of the
purchase price. The appellate court held that because the
parties made no attempt to set the liquidated damages at a
reasonable approximation of the estimated damages,the
liquidated damage clause was an unenforceable punitive
damage clause under Montana law. The case was
remanded for a hearing on the actual damages. Weber v.
Rivera, 841 P.2d 534 (Mont. 1992).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BANKS. The plaintiff was a bank which  made FmHA
guaranteed loans to farmers. After one borrower defaulted
on a guaranteed loan, the bank took possession of the
collateral and sold it, depositing the proceeds in an escrow
account pending resolution of the distribution between the
bank and the FmHA.  The two parties were unable to
reach an agreement and the bank used some of the
proceeds to offset the borrower’s debt. After further
negotiations failed to resolve the matter, the FmHA
refused to guarantee any new loans made by the bank,
although the FmHA did continue to service and renew
existing guaranteed loans. The bank sued the FmHA for
deprivation of constitutional rights in that the FmHA
terminated its business relationship with the bank without
following its own regulations for termination. The bank
argued that this deprived it of its property without due
process of law and deprived the bank of its right to
petition the government for redress of grievances. The trial
court awarded the bank an injunction against the
termination by the FmHA but denied the bank any
damages. The appellate court affirmed the judgment,
holding that the bank did not have a constitutionally
protected “property right” in its continued participation in
the guaranteed loan program. Although the court held that
the FmHA’s actions deprived the bank of its First
Amendment right to pursue its claim against the
government, the deprivation did not warrant more than the
injunction. Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d
1362 (11th Cir. 1993).
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued an interim
rule changing Oregon from a Class A to Class Free state.
58 Fed. Reg. 4360 (Jan. 14, 1993).
CONSERVATION. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations amending the Conservation Reserve Program
to allow producers to include small farmed wetlands in the
CRP acres. 58 Fed. Reg. 4063 (Jan. 13, 1993).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM. The FCA has issued
proposed regulations allowing certain board members to
certify quarterly reports for the whole board. 58 Fed.Reg.
3872 (Jan. 12, 1993).
FEED GRAINS. The CCC has adopted as final
regulations establishing the 1993 feed grain Acreage
Reduction Program percentages as 5 percent for grain
sorghum, 10 percent for corn and zero percent for barley
and oats. The final rules also provide that no paid land
diversion program will be implemented.
The price support levels for 1993 feed grains are:
Corn $1.42/bu.
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Grain sorghum 1.63/bu.
Barley 1.40/bu.
Oats .08/bu.
Rye 1.46/bu.
Soybeans 5.02/bu.
Oil seeds .089/lb.
 58 Fed. Reg. 4303 (Jan. 14, 1993).
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT . The plaintiff had
entered into a contract with the U.S. military to supply
frozen fruit. The plaintiff contracted with the USDA to
inspect the shipments to certify that the shipments met
contract and military specifications. The USDA performed
the inspections and issued certificates of compliance but
later issued superseding certificates finding that the fruit
did not meet contract specifications. The plaintiff sued the
USDA for negligent inspection. The court held that the
plaintiff’s action was actually a claim of
misrepresentation, an action barred under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Rich Products Corp. v.
U.S., 804 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Calif. 1992).
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL
LAND . The USDA has issued proposed regulations
amending the regulations governing the reporting
requirements for the disclosure of foreign investment in
agricultural land. The proposed regulations clarify the
definition of agricultural land by incorporating the Forest
Service’s definition of forest land. 58 Fed. Reg. 3871
(Jan. 12, 1993).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiffs were highway workers
who claimed physical injuries from herbicides they
applied which were manufactured by the defendants. The
plaintiff suit was based on the defendant's negligence for
failure to warn of the dangers from use of the herbicides.
The defendants claimed that their registration and
approval of the herbicides under FIFRA preempted any
state tort action for failure to warn. Although the court
noted contrary case precedent, the court held that FIFRA
preempted state tort action for failure to warn. The court
noted that a state tort action may be allowed if the failure
to warn involved a failure to warn by means other than a
label. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged only a failure to
warn on the defendant’s products. King v. E.I. Du Pont
Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Me. 1992).
MILK MARKETING ORDERS. The USDA
announced the proposed merger of four milk marketing
orders. The proper notice of a hearing was made but the
USDA declined to schedule a hearing on alternative
proposals offered by the plaintiffs, an association of dairy
processors. The plaintiff obtained an injunction from the
trial court and the USDA appealed, arguing that the
District Court was without jurisdiction because the
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the failure of the
plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies
deprived the District Court of jurisdiction in the matter.
Alabama Dairy Products Ass’n, Inc. v. Yeutter, 980
F.2d 1421 (11th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.  An
irrevocable trust was funded by testamentary bequest in
1973. The grantor’s surviving spouse was the first lifetime
beneficiary and in 1990, added property to the trust by
testamentary exercise of a power of appointment. The
decedent’s GSTT exemption was allocated to this
property. The decedents’ three children are the current
lifetime beneficiaries with their issue as remainder
holders. The trust was partitioned into three equal trusts
and amended to clarify voting rights of trust stock. The
IRS ruled that the partitioning and clarification did not
subject the trust to GSTT.  In addition, the IRS ruled that
the 1990 addition to trust corpus and allocation of GSTT
exemption was deemed a creation of a separate trust as to
the added property, with an inclusion ratio of zero, but that
this trust did not affect the exempt status of the three
trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9302019, Oct. 16, 1992.
The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust in 1978,
with the grantor as lifetime beneficiary and the grantor’s
spouse and children as remainder beneficiaries. The trust,
as modified, required at least two trustees, one of which
was the grantor or successor beneficiary and the other was
required to be an unrelated party. A trustee/beneficiary
was not allowed to authorize any distributions of trust
property to the beneficiary or take any action for the
beneficiary’s benefit. The beneficiary/trustee had the
power to replace the independent trustee “for cause” only
and the trust listed 13 reasons for such cause. The IRS
ruled that the trust was not includible in the grantor’s or
successor beneficiaries’ gross estate. The grantor made
several post-1985 contributions to the trust and allocated
available GSTT exclusion to these transfers. The IRS
ruled that the inclusion ratio for the additions was zero and
that the changes in the trustee rules did not subject the pre-
additions property to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9303018, Oct. 23,
1992.
GIFTS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DEATH.  In
1984, the decedent established a revocable trust with the
decedent as co-trustee and sole beneficiary. The decedent
retained the power to require distribution of trust principal
and the trustee had the power to distribute trust property to
third parties as requested by the decedent in writing.
Within the three years before the decedent’s death, the
decedent orally instructed the corporate trustee to make
distributions of trust property to specified donees. Citing
Est. of Jalkut v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 675 (1991), acq., 1991-2
C.B. 1, the IRS ruled that the gifts were includible in the
decedent’s gross estate under I.R.C. §§ 2038(a)(1) or
2035(a), (d)(2) because the trustee had the authority to
make distributions directly to third parties. The IRS ruled
that any requirement that distributions to third parties be
made only by written request from the decedent was a
procedural requirement only and did not affect the
trustee’s basic authority to distribute property directly to
third parties.  The IRS rejected the executor’s argument
that the trustee was acting as the decedent’s agent,
distributing property of the decedent and not trust property
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directly from the trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9301004, Sept. 25,
1992.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX.
On the date of death, stock in a corporation was held as
follows: (1) 786 shares held by a trust with the decedent as
sole lifetime income and principal beneficiary, (2) 682
shares held by a trust for two of decedent’s grandchildren,
(3) 189 shares owned by decedent’s son and wife, (4)
1,240 shares held by a grantor retained interest trust for
the decedent’s brother, and (5) 11,278 shares owned by
others. The stock was not readily tradable. The IRS ruled
that the first four groups of stock were treated as owned by
the decedent for purposes of installment payment of estate
tax. The IRS also ruled that because the total of these
shares exceeded 20 percent of all stock in the corporation,
the decedent’s estate was eligible for installment payment
of estate tax. In addition, these shares are also included in
the decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9301014, Oct. 9,
1992.
IRA’S. The decedent and surviving spouse established
a trust which was made the beneficiary of several IRA’s
owned by the decedent. The surviving spouse was the
remainder lifetime beneficiary of the trust and could
require distribution of trust income and corpus. After the
death of the decedent, the surviving spouse elected to have
all of the funds in the IRA’s transferred to the trust,
transferred to the surviving spouse and then rolled over to
IRA’s owned by the surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that
the decedent’s IRA’s were not “inherited IRA” under
I.R.C. § 408(d)(3)(C) and that the distributions from the
IRA were not income to the surviving spouse. Ltr. Rul.
9301022, Oct. 19, 1992.
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
bequeathed the decedent’s interest in the house to the
surviving spouse “so long as she may wish,” with the
remainder to pass to the decedent’s issue. The decedent's
three surviving children and one surviving grandchild
disclaimed their remainder interests in the house. The will
provided that if an heir disclaims an interest in estate
property, the property passed as if the disclaimant
predeceased the decedent. The IRS ruled that because the
number of heirs, for purposes of the disclaimers, is finite,
only the four living remainder holders needed to disclaim
the interests in the house for the entire fee to pass to the
surviving spouse. The IRS ruled that the house was
eligible for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9301005,
Sept. 30, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The decedent
bequeathed interests in four orchards to the decedent's four
children. The estate elected to value the property at its
special use valuation but obtained only the signatures of
two of the children for the required qualified heir
agreement as to liability for any recapture tax.  The court
had granted the estate additional time to obtain the other
two signatures but the estate was able to obtain only one
additional signature. No reason was given for the failure to
obtain the last signature. The court held that the estate
could make a partial election of special use valuation for
the interests for which a signature was obtained. The court
discussed the issue of whether the estate would be
required to elect special use valuation for at least 25
percent of the value of the estate but did not decide the
issue because the partial election would exceed 25 percent
of the estate. Gettysburg Nat’l Bank v. U.S., 806 F.
Supp. 511 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
A decedent’s estate elected to value farm and ranch
land at the special use value and provided all information
on and with the estate tax return except an appraisal of the
land. The Tax Court held that the election was invalid for
lack of the appraisal and that the election could not be
perfected.  The appellate court reversed, holding that the
election substantially complied with the election
requirements and the estate could perfect the election by
filing the required appraisal.  Est. of Doherty v. Comm’r,
93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,125 (10th Cir. 1992),
rev’g, 95 T.C. 446 (1990).
   TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.  The
taxpayer formed a corporation and transferred over $4
million in assets to the corporation in exchange for
common and preferred stock. Within two weeks after the
formation of the corporation, the taxpayer transferred the
common stock to the taxpayer's children and within one
year transferred about a third of the preferred shares to the
taxpayer’s spouse. The taxpayer retained voting control
over the corporation but the dividend on the preferred
shares was set substantially lower than the yield for such
an investment on the open market. The IRS cited Snyder v.
Comm’r, 93 T.C. 529 (1989) to support its ruling that the
taxpayer’s failure to either (1) increase the yield of the
preferred shares or (2) convert the preferred shares to
common stock constituted a gift of the difference between
the actual annual dividend on the preferred shares and the
dividend the corporation was able to pay on the shares.
Ltr. Rul. 9301001, June 30, 1992.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer established a charitable
remainder unitrust with the taxpayer as lifetime
beneficiary, the spouse as remainder beneficiary and a
college as a charitable organization remainder holder. The
trust provided for annual distribution of (1) the lesser of 8
percent of the net fair market value of the trust assets or
the net trust income for the year, or (2) the amount of trust
income for the year in excess of the unitrust amount to the
extent that distributions of previous trust years were less
than the unitrust amount for those years. The taxpayer
designated the trust as a remainder beneficiary of
distributions from a retirement plan. The IRS ruled that
the trust qualified as a charitable remainder unitrust as to
the taxpayer and to the spouse as a remainder beneficiary.
The IRS also ruled that if the spouse does survive the
taxpayer, the present value of the spouse’s interest in the
taxpayer’s retirement plan which passed to the trust would
be eligible for the marital deduction. The IRS also ruled
that value of the remainder interest passing to the college
would qualify for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul.
9253038, Oct. 5, 1992.
The taxpayer and decedent executed wills which
established testamentary trusts for their three children. The
trusts named the beneficiaries as co-trustee of their
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respective trusts and provided for an independent co-
trustee. The trusts were supposed to restrict the power of
the beneficiary/trustee to distribute trust property to the
beneficiary but the provision was inadvertently omitted.
After the death of the decedent, the surviving spouse
petitioned for and obtained a state probate court order to
reform the trust to retroactively prohibit the
beneficiary/trustee from distributing trust property to the
beneficiary. The IRS ruled that the reformation of the trust
did not act as a release of the beneficary/trustee's general
power of appointment and that the trust property would
not be included in the beneficiary’s gross estate.  The IRS
also ruled that the reformation would not subject the pre-
1985 trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9303022, Oct. 26, 1992.
VALUATION. The taxpayer owned all of the shares
of a corporation and transferred the shares in equal
proportion to five children.  The IRS revoked Rev. Rul.
81-253, 1981-1 C.B. 187 and ruled that a minority
discount of the value of the separate gifts of stock to
family members would not be disallowed solely because
of aggregating the interests of the other family members at
the time of the gift.  The IRS ruled that the new rule
applied whether or not all of the stock was transferred.
The IRS changed the nonacquiescense of Est. of Lee v.
Comm’r, 69 T.C. 860 (1978) to an acquiescence. Rev.
Rul. 93-12, I.R.B. 1993-7.
The taxpayer transferred the mineral interest in
property to a ten-year trust for the taxpayer’s children. The
trust provided for distribution of income less a 15 percent
depletion reserve. The trustees had the power to sell or
dispose of trust property and reinvest in other productive
property. The taxpayer filed a gift tax return and valued
the gift by first reducing the fair market value by the 15
percent depletion reserve and then valuing the income
interest using Table B of Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5(f). The
taxpayer argued that the use of the table was appropriate
because the trustees had the power to sell the depleting
asset and reinvest in nondepleting assets. The court held
that the value of the interest was to be decreased by the 15
percent depletion reserve but no further reduction in value
could be made because the asset would be depleted before
the termination of the trust. The court pointed out that the
taxpayer provided no indication of any intention by the
trustees to sell the trust property. Froh v. Comm’r, 100
T.C. No. 1 (1993).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
WARNING ON SHORT SALES
The Digest has learned that the IRS has taken the
position that short sales using “puts” are properly
characterized as capital transactions under the authority of
Arkansas Best Corp. v. Comm’r, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).
That would mean that losses in such transactions are
capital losses, deductible only to the extent of capital gains
plus $3,000 of ordinary income. Corporations may deduct
capital losses only to the extent of capital gains. The IRS
is considering treating such trades as straddles with
attendant recordkeeping requirements and capitalization of
some expenditures.
The editors believe that the IRS interpretation
represents a narrow and constrained reading of Arkansas
Best but cautions practitioners and taxpayers to use care in
handling short sale transactions until the matter is fully
resolved. The discussion and examples in the Farmers Tax
Guide (Pub. 225) are not in accord with the new IRS
position.
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX. In computing
their alternative minimum tax, the taxpayers included in
the basis of oil and mineral deposits the costs of
depreciable items such as machinery, tools, and pipes. The
court held that for the purposes of the alternative
minimum tax, the adjusted basis of the oil and mineral
deposits did not include the costs of the depreciable assets.
U.S. v. Hill, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,037 (S. Ct.
1993), rev’g, 945 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers
owned real property subject to $246x of nonrecourse debt.
The lender agreed to discharge the debt in exchange for
the property. The property had a fair market value of
$112x and a basis to the taxpayers of $172x. The
taxpayers argued that the difference between the amount
of debt discharged and the fair market value of the
property was discharge of indebtedness income and that
the taxpayers were not liable for tax on that amount
because the taxpayers were insolvent before and after the
discharge of the debt. The IRS ruled that the discharge of
indebtedness exemption did not apply because the
transaction was a disposition of property and not a
discharge of indebtedness. Citing Commissioner v. Tufts,
461 U.S. 300 (1983) and Rev. Rul. 90-16, 1990-1 C.B. 12,
the IRS ruled that the taxpayers recognized gain to the
extent the amount of debt discharged exceeded the
taxpayers’ basis in the property transferred.  The
difference between the amount of debt discharged and the
taxpayers’ basis in the property was gain subject to tax
and not eligible for the I.R.C. § 108 insolvency exception.
The taxpayers argued that the transaction was identical in
effect to an initial reduction in the debt, producing
discharge of indebtedness income, followed by a transfer
of the property in satisfaction of the reduced debt. The IRS
indicated that if the facts demonstrated that chain of
events, the result would be discharge of indebtedness
income, but the facts in this case demonstrated a disposal
of property in satisfaction of debt. The ruling is in accord
with views expressed in the Digest. See 1 Agric. L. Digest
69 (1990).  Ltr. Rul. 9302001, Aug. 31, 1992.
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS. In November 1983, the
taxpayer corporation established a cafeteria plan for all
employees, effective retroactively from January 1983. The
IRS assessed a withholding tax deficiency for 1983 for
reimbursements to employees under the plan because the
employees’ elections under the plan operated retroactively
with respect to expenses incurred prior to commencement
of the plan. The taxpayer argued that the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 allowed transitional relief from the 1984
regulations for plans in effect when the regulations were
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promulgated. The court held that the retroactive effect of
the employees’ election disqualified the plan under the
rules in effect before the 1984 regulations; therefore, the
transitional rules did not apply. American Family
Mutual Ins. Co., v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax  Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,025 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
PARTNERSHIPS
DISTRIBUTIONS. A corporation issued indebtedness
without issue discount and an issue price of $100x. A
partnership in which the corporation was a partner
purchased some of the indebtedness for $100x without a
market discount. The partnership distributed this debt in
liquidation of the corporation’s partnership interest when
the debt had a basis of $100x and a fair market value of
$90x. The corporation’s partnership interest had a basis of
$25x and a fair market value of $90x.  The partnership had
no Section 751 assets and the corporation had a basis in its
partnership interest of $90x. The IRS ruled that the
nonrecognition rules of Section 732 did not apply because
no property remained in which to carry the corporation’s
basis in the partnership interest. The partnership, however,
may adjust the basis of remaining partnership property if
the partnership has a valid Section 754 election in effect.
Thus, in this case, the partnership had a $75x basis
adjustment ($100x partnership basis in the debt less the
corporation’s $25x partnership interest basis) but no
recognition of gain or loss. The corporation recognized
$65x of gain ($90x fair market value less $25x basis in the
debt). In addition, the corporation recognized $10x of
discharge of indebtedness income ($100x issue price of
debt less $90x fair market value).  Rev. Rul. 93-7, I.R.B.
1993-4.
PENALTIES.  The IRS has issued proposed
regulations establishing penalties for substantial and gross
valuation misstatements attributable to I.R.C. § 482
allocations involving intercompany transfer pricing. 58
Fed. Reg. 5304 (Jan. 21, 1993).
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS has
announced the 1993 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
or Exchange Amount Amount
1993 $3,332,400 $2,380,300
The $3,332,400 figure is the dividing line for 1993 below
which (in terms of seller financing) the minimum interst
rate is the lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal
Rate. Where the amount of seller financing exceeds the
$2,380,300 figure, theimputed rate is 100 pnt of the AFR
except in cases of sale-leaseback transactions, where the
imputed rate is 110 percent of AFR.  Rev. Rul. 93-14.
REFUNDS. The IRS had determined that the taxpayer
was entitled to a refund of taxes overpaid in 1979 and
interest on the overpayment. Instead of refunding the
interest owed, the IRS credited the interest against the
taxpayer’s 1980 tax liability. However, the 1980 tax
liability was already contested and in a case concerning
that liability, the court had awarded the taxpayer a refund.
In the present case, the IRS argued that no refund was due
because the refund was “paid” by offset against the 1980
tax liability. The court held that because the 1980 tax
liability was eventually determined not to exist, no offset
was possible and the refund remained outstanding.  The
IRS also argued that the action was barred by the statute of
limitations under I.R.C. §§ 6511, 7422 for actions for
refunds of taxes already paid. The court held that because
the setoff could not occur where the 1980 tax liability
never arose, the six-year limitations period of I.R.C.§
6611 applied because the suit was for payment of an
amount due from the IRS. Lyons v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,025 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
FEBRUARY 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.23 4.19 4.17 4.15
110% AFR 4.66 4.61 4.58 4.57
120% AFR 5.09 5.03 5.00 4.98
Mid-term
AFR 6.22 6.13 6.08 6.05
110% AFR 6.85 6.74 6.68 6.65
120% AFR 7.50 7.36 7.29 7.25
Long-term
AFR 7.16 7.04 6.98 6.94
110% AFR 7.89 7.74 7.67 7.62
120% AFR 8.63 8.45 8.36 8.30
S CORPORATIONS
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  In 1979 the
taxpayer's S corporation claimed a loss deduction from the
corporation's share of a partnership's losses.  The taxpayer
claimed a share of the corporation's loss on the taxpayer's
individual tax return.  The taxpayers signed Form 872-A
extending the statute of limitations for assessments on
their individual return but no extension was made for the S
corporation's return.  After the statute of limitations had
run on the corporation's return but during the individual
return extension, the IRS disallowed the partnership loss
deduction and assessed the taxpayers for their share of the
disallowed losses reported through the S corporation.  The
taxpayers argued that the statute of limitations had run on
the S corporation losses.  In a ruling which decided a
disagreement among the Circuit Courts of Appeals, the
court held that the statute of limitations on the taxpayer’s
individual return applied to the assessment because the
corporation's return did not finally establish the taxpayer’s
liability.  Bufferd v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶
50,038 (S. Ct. 1993), aff’g, 952 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1992),
aff'g, T.C. Memo. 1991-170.
TAX YEAR.  An S corporation on the calendar tax
year redeemed the shares of three of its four shareholders
in June of 1988. The corporation made an election, under
I.R.C. § 1377(a)(2), on its 1988 tax return to treat 1988 as
having two tax years. The Schedules K-1 were prepared
consistent with the election and the shareholders’
individual returns were based on the K-1’s. However, the
statement of election required by Treas. Reg. § 18.1377-1
was missing from the return. The IRS ruled that the
corporation’s election substantially complied with the
regulations because the corporation and shareholders all
filed their returns consistent with the election, thus
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removing any opportunity to disavow the election to the
prejudice of the IRS. Ltr. Rul. 9303005, Oct. 19, 1992.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
CONDEMNATION. The plaintiff leased 1.2 acres
from the landlord for the purpose of access to the
plaintiff’s property. The land was also used for a garden
and pasture. The landlord’s land was acquired through
condemnation proceedings by the highway commission
and the condemnation award placed in escrow. The
landlord informed the plaintiff of the condemnation and
terminated the lease. The lease initially was for one year,
but after the first year could be terminated by one month’s
notice at anytime.  The plaintiff claimed a portion of the
condemnation proceeds. The court held that the
condemnation terminated the lease and that a month-to-
month lease was not compensable upon condemnation.
State v. Muegge, 842 S.W.2d 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
NUISANCE
HOG FARM. The plaintiffs sued for damages and an
injunction against the defendant’s neighboring hog farm.
The jury verdict found the defendant’s farm to be a private
nuisance and awarded the plaintiff damages for past
impairment of the quality of life, damages for reduction in
property value and damages for future impairment of the
quality of life. The trial court entered a limited injunction
requiring the defendant to change the operation to
ameliorate the problems complained of by the plaintiffs
and vacated the jury award for future damages because the
injunction removed the impairments. The appellate court
also reversed the award for loss of property value because
the injunction removed the nuisance and restored the
property value. Staley v. Sagel, 841 P.2d 379 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINE. The plaintiff was injured when the
plaintiff attempted to unclog the cornhead on a combine
while the power to the cornhead was still engaged. The
plaintiff sued the defendant who manufactured the
combine for negligent design in that the combine did not
have a seat switch which would automatically cut the
power when the driver left the seat.  The plaintiff’s brother
installed such a switch after the accident and the plaintiff
proved that the technology for the switch was available
when the combine was manufactured. The jury found for
the plaintiff but reduced the award by 75 percent for the
plaintiff’s own negligence.  The appellate court affirmed
the jury verdict, rejecting the defendant’s argument that
the combine could not be found to be unreasonably
dangerous if the danger was open and obvious to the user.
The court held that the jury properly weighed the
dangerousness of the combine under the integrated
consumer expectation test and risk/benefit test. Besse v.
Deere & Co., 604 N.E.2d 998 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992).
SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
 BREEDING RIGHTS.  The plaintiff contracted with
a horse breeder to breed the plaintiff’s mare with a
stallion. The contract provided for prepayment with the
right to a refund if a live foal was not produced. The foal
was stillborn and the horse breeder offered to breed the
horses again for “no charge in lieu of refund.” However,
the breeding rights of the stallion were owned by a third
party which had granted a security interest in the breeding
rights to the defendant. The defendant refused to give the
plaintiff the stallion service certificate for the foal
produced from the second mating until the plaintiff made
payment. The stallion service certificate was needed to
certify the parentage of the foal. The court reversed a
summary judgment for the defendant, holding that fact
issues remained as to whether the stallion service
certificate was property which could be collateral, because
the certificate could be replaced without the creditor’s
permission. In addition, a fact issue remained as to
whether the defendant had given permission for the
breeding contract collateral to be sold with or without
prior written permission. Shields v. Equine Capital
Corp., 607 So.2d 468 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
PRIORITY.  The plaintiff was granted a security
interest in the debtor’s 1985 potato crop. The debtor sold
some of the crop as seed potatoes to another grower who
was in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court had granted a
security interest in the grower’s crops to the grower’s
creditors in exchange for the use of cash collateral. The
debtor filed a seed lien against the grower without first
obtaining relief from the automatic stay. When the
grower’s potatoes were sold to the defendant, the plaintiff
sought a portion of the proceeds based on its security
interest in the debtor’s seed potatoes sold to the grower.
The court held that the plaintiff lost its security interest
when the debtor sold the potatoes to the grower because
the plaintiff had a history of allowing the debtor to sell
collateral without prior consent. The court also held that
the implied consent to sell the collateral  also caused the
plaintiff to lose its security interest in identifiable proceeds
of the collateral, under U.C.C. § 9-306(2),because the
proceeds were not held by the debtor. Eastern Idaho
Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Idaho Gem, 842 P.2d 282 (Idaho
1992).
